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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKS.AND BANKING-JOINT ACCOUNTS-COMMERCIAL DEPOSITS.-

In January, 1902, the testator opened a checking account in his own
name in a commercial bank. In November following, he caused his
wife's name to b6 added to the pass-book, "so she could have access to
the funds in'the account; that she had as much right to draw as he did."
In the period that intervened before his death in 1906, the testator
purchased various bonds and mortgages, taking them in the names of
husband "ind wife. By will he directed that upon his wife's death or
remarriage the residue of his estate should pass to designated persons.
The -&ife, an executrix of the will, remarried in 1909. In 1927, proceedings for a compulsory accounting were instituted. Held, that the wife
must account for the commercial bank deposit; as to the bonds and
mortgages, title having passed to her by survivorship, she need not
account. Matter of Wilkins, 131 Misc. 188 (Surr. Ct. 1928).
Surrogate Slater, in an exhaustive and interesting opinion, considered
at great length the fundamental differences between savings and commercial banks-their purposes, their modes of conducting business, the
relative' unimportance of passbooks in commercial banking, the means of
transferring ownership of deposits. While it is to be remembered that
the decision of the precise point in issue was based upon the law as it
existed at the time of the testator's death, the surrogate's learned
discussion has, despite statutory changes,' great intrinsic value.
The widow contended that the bank deposit, having been jointly
owned, became hers by survivorship. Since there had been no assignment, oral or written, of the account it became necessary to look for the
intent of the testator.2 From the evidence it appeared that the testator
owned all the funds. There was found no indication that the testator
intended to pass title to the funds to his wife, that he had made a
present gift of them, or that he had declared a trust for her benefit. It
was concluded that apparently the wife's name had been added to the
passbook for convenience merely. Her interest, then, was solely that
of an agent, and by the death of the husband the agency to draw money
from the account had been terminated. 3 In fine, the right of survivorship
ordinarily incident to savings bank deposits in this form, did not attach
to the Commercial account here concerned.
Upon the question of the ownership of the bonds and mortgages,
there was not much need for discussion. It seems well settled that
where husband and wife each advance money on a bond and mortgage,
they become tenants in common without right of survivorship. 4 Here,
however, the funds were entirely the husband's. The addition of the
of Marshall, 217 App. Div. 229, 216 N. Y. Supp. 673 (1926).
' Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (1904) ; Beaver v. Beaver,
117 N. Y. 421, 22 N. E. 940 (1889).
3 Matter of Bolin, 136 N. Y. 177, 179, 32 N. E. 626 (1892).
4Matter of Albrecht, 136 N. Y. 91, 32 N. E. 632 (1892).
1 Matter
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wife's name was presumably for her benefit 5 and survivorship attaches.
In 1914, the Banking Law was amended so as to provide that a
deposit made by a person in the name of himself and another and in
form payable to either or the survivor, and all accretions thereto, shall
become the joint property of both parties, payable to either during the
lifetime of both, or to the survivor of them. 6 This statutory provision,
however, does not derogate from the value of Surrogate Slater's able
review and discussion of bank deposit cases.
BILLS AND NOTES-LIABILITY OF UNAUTHORIZED
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw.-Plaintiff sued on a

AGENT UNDER

promissory note
signed "J. & G. Lippmann, L. J. Lippmann, Pres.," alleging in its complaint that the corporate defendant denied the authority of the individual
defendant to execute the note as its president, and demanding judgment
against the corporate defendant, or in the alternative, against the individual defendant, in the manner authorized by the Practice Act.1 The
individual defendant attacked the complaint upon the ground that,
granting he signed the note on behalf of the corporation without
authority, he could not be held liable upon the note but only for breach
of warranty of authority, and that, therefore, the complaint, predicated
upon the note itself, stated no cause of action against him. Held,
individual defendant liable upon the note, one justice dissenting (apparently on the ground that Negotiable Instruments Law §392 admits
of no negative implication). New Georgia National Bank v. J. & G.
Lippmann, a New York Corporation, impleaded with L. J. Lippmann,
Individually, 222 App. Div. 383 (1st Dept. 192R).
The rule enunciated in the prevailing opinion that an agent who.
without authority, executes a negotiable instrument in the name of his
principal is himself liable on the instrument finds general approbation
among courts and text writers. 3 This rule, however, was not followed
5Matter of Blumenthal, 236 N. Y. 448, 141 N. E. 911 (1923).
ON. Y. Banking L., 1914, Sec. 198.
1 N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act. § 213.
2 "Liability of person signing as agent. Where the instrument contains or
a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf
of a principal, or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument, if he was duly authorized." (Uniform N. I. L. § 20).
3 2Williston, Contracts § 1144. "The words 'if he was duly authorized' seem
to carry the imlication that if unauthorized the agent is not merely liable for
breach of a norA-negotiable warranty, but liable on the instrument itself."
Brannan's Neg. Inst. Law (4th Ed.) p. 163. Professor Ames, "Under this
section, an agent signing without authority of the principal is, by implication,
liable on the instrument."
Judge Brewster, one of the commissioners who drafted the N. I. L. writes:
"There is no injustice. The agent should know whether he has authority.
He should be liable as the maker of the note. Such is the rule of the
German Code."
Accord, Professor McKeehan and Professor Chafee, the editor of the
fourth edition of Brannan's Neg. Inst. Law.

